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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE W. FLICK, * 
Plaintiff and Respondent, * 
vs. * 
GLEN VAN TASSELL and VAN'S SERVICE, * 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
* 
Defendants and Appellants. 
* 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to recover monies advanced by the Plaintiff 
to the Defendants. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Judgment was entered for the Plaintiff on April 2, 197 5, 
against the Defendants, jointly and severally. Appeal was not 
taken from the judgment. The Defendants appeal from an adverse 
decision upon their motion under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
60(b)(1) to set aside the judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Defendants request that the Court reverse the trial judge, 
that the Court dismiss the judgment against Van's Service or 
reduce the amount of the judgment. None of these forms of relief 
Case No. 
14154 
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are within the jurisdiction of the Court in this matter, because 
no appeal was taken timely from the judgment entered herein. The 
relief available to the Defendants on this motion is limited 
solely to a review of the exercise of the trial Court's discretion 
denying the motion of the Defendants under Rule 60(b). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was filed in December of 1973. (R-l) An appear-
ance was duly entered for the Defendants by Boyd M. Fullmer, who 
continued to represent the Defendants as counsel of record until 
March 19, 1975, (R-159), at which time he was permitted to with-
draw. The record shows that Mr. Fullmer participated in depositions 
and other discovery; that he appeared in opposition to motions of 
the Plaintiff and that he was personally involved as counsel at 
every stage of the preceedings, including pretrials, up to the 
date set for the trial in the matter below. (R-l to R-160) On 
February 28, 1975, Plaintiff notified Defendant of the impending 
trial date and because Plaintiff had heard that Defendants were 
replacing their counsel, the notice requested Defendants to get 
new counsel prior to the trial. (R-149, R-150) On March 4, 
1975, Mr, Fullmer requested permission from Judge Thornley Swan 
at a hearing on a motion filed by Mr. Fullmer for permission to 
withdraw as counsel for Defendants. Then or shortly thereafter, 
Mr, Fullmer filed a written motion for permission to withdraw. 
(R-152). Judge Swan advised Mr. Fullmer that the motion to 
withdraw would be denied if it meant that a continuance of the 
trial date would be necessary. Based on the March 4, hearing, 
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a written order was issued by the Court, of which Mr. Fullmer 
had due notice, ordering that the trial proceed on March 19, and 
giving the Defendants until March 14, to respond to certain 
interrogatories and requests for admissions served upon them 
months earlier by the Plaintiff. (R-155). No responses to the 
interrogatories have ever been tendered by the Defendants and 
the requests for admissions were deemed admitted on March 14, 
for the failure of Defendants to respond. (R-160 et seq.). 
At the trial, Plaintiff appeared with his counsel and Boyd M. 
Fullmer appeared for the sole purpose of withdrawingf although 
he was still counsel of record for the Defendants. Fullmer 
stated in open Court that he no longer had the file and didn't 
want to try the case from memory. (Transcript of Trial, March 19, 
1975, hereinafter Trial Tr. at 3). He stated that Glen Van 
Tassell and his replacement counsel, J. Reed Tuft, were fully 
aware of the trial setting for that morning, and that Tuft may 
have reviewed the file as early as the 28th of February, 1975. 
(Trial Tr. 3). Mr. Fullmer then withdrew from the courtroom and 
the Plaintiff put on his evidence, leading ultimately to a 
judgment for the Plaintiff against the Defendants jointly and 
severally, entered April 2, 1975. The time for appeal from the 
judgment ran on May 2, 1975, and was not extended by a motion 
under Rules 52 or 59. (R-178). 
J* Reed Tuft, who had filed a motion for permission to appear 
prior to the trial, filed a motion under Rule 60(b) to vacate the 
April 2, judgment. (R-180). The grounds alleged in the said 
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motion were as follows: Defendant, Van Tassell, had business 
interests outside of the state, which led to communication problems 
between himself and his attorney, and to dissatisfaction on the 
part of Van Tassell with the services of Boyd Fullmer; Fullmer 
sought to withdraw unsuccessfully and Tuft, Van Tassell's replace-
ment counsel, refused to appear until Fullmer was released; there-
fore Van Tassell was allegedly without counsel at the March 19, 
hearing; Tuft had not been familiar with the file on March 19, 
but at the time of the Rule 60(b) hearing, he was ready to pro-
ceed; and Van Tassell had an unspecified defense. 
At the hearing on the motion under Rule 60(b), held April 
24, 1975, the trial court heard evidence regarding further grounds, 
(Transcript of April 24, 1975, hearing, hereinafter Tr. of Apr. 
24 hearing). Van Tassell testified that although he was not 
fully aware of the differences between a trial and a pretrail, 
Fullmer had stated that the March 19 hearing was a pretrial and 
the Van tassell need not attend. Van Tassell also testified, 
however, that Fullmer had told him that the March 19, hearing 
was a trial. (Tr. of Apr. 24, hearing at 13). Fullmer testified, 
in turnf that he doubted he had told Van Tassell that the hearing 
was a pre-trial. Fullmer stated that he had told Van Tassell 
prior to the hearing that he would do nothing more at the trial 
hearing than appear and withdraw. Fullmer further testified 
that the order on the hearing of March 4, would have been for-
warded to his clients as part of his usual practice to forward 
all orders when received. Fullmer testified that Van Tassell had 
_4-
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notice and full understanding of the requests for admissions and 
unanswered interrogatories prior to March 14, and with time to 
respond, (Tr. of Apr. 24, hearing at 19-28). 
Based on the testimony and the record, the Court denied the 
Rule 60(b) motion by memorandum decision entered on the 15th day 
of May, 1975* The Court signed an order on its memorandum 
opinion on June 10, 1975, and this appeal was commenced by notice 
filed June 19, 1975, by Boyd M. Fullmer, who again represents 
Defendants as their counsel on this appeal. 
POINT ONE 
The Court Should Dismiss all of Defendants Appeal Except 
That Part Pertaining to the Denial of Defendant1s Motion Under 
Rule 60(b). | 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 73(a) provides as follows: 
"When an appeal is permitted from a district court to the 
Supreme Court, the time within which an appeal may be taken 
shall be one month.... The running of the time for appeal 
is terminated by a timely motion made pursuant to any of the 
rules hereinafter enumerated, and the full time for appeal 
fixed in this subdivision commences to run and is to be 
computed from the entry in the minutes of any of the follow-
ing orders made upon a timely motion under such rules: 
granting or denying a motion for judgment under Rule 50(b), 
or granting or denying a motion under Rule 52(b) to amend or 
make additional findings of fact, whether or not an alteration 
of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted? 
or granting or denying a motion under Rule 59 to alter or 
amend the judgment; or denying a motion for a new trial under 
Rule 59". 
Notice of appeal is a prerequisite to the jurisdiction of 
the reviewing court. In the case of In re Estate of Ratliff, 
19 Utah 2d 346, 431 P.2d 571 (1967), this court held it had no 
jurisdiction because appellant had failed to tender the fee for 
-5-
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filing the notice of appeal within a month after judgment. 
Furthermore, no relief from failure of appellant to file his 
appeal on time may be granted under Rule 6(b) which permits 
extension of time in general on the ground of excusable neglect, 
or under Rule 60(b) which applies to relief from judgments on 
the gound of excusable neglect. Anderson vs. Anderson, 3 Utah 
2d 277, 280, 282 P.2d 845, 847 (1955). See generally Galanis vs. 
Mayes, 16 Utah 2d 181, 397 P.2d 998 (1965). 
Judgment was entered below on April 2, 1975, (R-178), and the 
Notice of Appeal bears the filing stamp of the Davis County Clerk 
of June 19, 1975, 78 days later. (R-237). Clearly Defendants 
failed to appeal from the judgment and thereby lost that portion 
of their appeal. To hold otherwise would give the trial court 
power to confer jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court after appel-
late jurisdiction has been lost. £f. Holbrook vs. Hodson, 24 Utah 
2d 120, 123, 466 P.2d 843 (1970). 
Defendants PraY for relief pertaining to the merits of the 
judgment below, yet it is clear that Rule 60(b) is no substitute 
for appeal. (Meadows vs. Cohen, 409 F.2d 750, 752, (5th Cir. 1969); 
Schildhaus vs. Moe, 335 F.2d 529, 531 (2d Cir. 1964); McDowell vs. 
Celebrezze, 310 F.2d 43, 44 (5th Cir. 1962); Well-Mixed, Inc. vs. 
City of Anchorage, 471 P.2d 408 (Alaska 1970). The reason for 
this rule was stated in Horace vs. St. Louis Southwestern Railroad 
Co., 489 F.2d 632, 633 (8th Cir. 1974) where appellants had allowed 
the time for appeal to run and later appealed from a denial of 
Rule 60(b) motion as follows: 
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"Rule 60(b) is addressed to the sound discretion of the 
trial judge and is not available as a substitute for appeal... 
It provides for extraordinary relief which may be granted 
only upon an adequate showing of execeptionalcircumstances..." 
489 F.2d at 633. 
Therefore, although the Defendants seek modification or 
reversal of the judgment entered April 2, 1975, herein they are 
entitled to neither form of relief, because appeal from an order 
denying a Rule 60(b) motion brings up only the order and not 
the judgment, Lee vs. Brown, 210 Kan. 168, 499 P.2d 1076 (1972)? 
Neagle vs. Brooks, 203 Kan. 323, 454, P.2d 544 (1969). 
POINT TWO 
The Defendants made No Attack on the Merits of the Judgment 
Entered Herein at the Time of Their Motion Under Rule 60(b), and 
Their Contentions Attacking the Judgment Should Not Be Reviewed 
On This Appeal. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which is patterned 
after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), provides extra-
ordinary relief from a judgment. Like all motions, however, it 
is limited by the provisions of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7, 
which requires that grounds for a motion be stated with particulari 
in the motion. The purpose for this requirement is to create a 
record upon which a decision may be made, and if a party deems it 
advisable, to appeal from the decision on the record. Under 
familiar principles, the record made in the written motion may 
also include matters heard in evidence pursuant to Rule 43. 
The record on which the Defendants1 Motion for Relief 
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Pursuant to Rules 55 and 60(b) is based is expressed in the 
written motion and the transcript of the hearing on the motion. 
Contentions outside of this record were not before the trial 
court below when he ruled on the Defendants1 Rule 60(b) motion 
and should hot be a bisis for appeal here. 
Several recent Utah Supreme Court decisions present reason-
ing which sheds light on the principles governing matters raised 
for the first time on appeal. Dallof vs. Robinson, 520 P.2d 191 
(Utah 1974) was an appeal in which the appellant claimed for the 
first time on appeal that the judgment was barred by the workman's 
compensation statute. In Patton vs. Lloyd, 28 Utah 2d 57, 497 
P.2d 1382 (1972), appellants claimed for the first time on appeal 
that their attorney below had acted unethically. The jury found 
for the defense in Simpson vs. General Motors Corp., 24 Utah 2d 
301, 470 P.2d 399 (1970) and on appeal for the first time appel-
lant demanded that the principle of strict liability apply to the 
case* In all of thes cases the court refused to review the new 
matter on appeal. In Simpson, the Court reasoned as follows: 
"The contention relating to strict liability is an attempt 
to inject that doctrine into this case for the first time 
on appeal* It was dealt with neither in the plaintiff's 
complaint, nor in the pretrial conference, nor at the trial. 
It is therefore not appropriate to address, such a contention 
to this court. Orderly procedure, whose proper purpose is 
the final settlement of controversies, requires that a 
party must present his entire case and his theory or theories 
of recovery to the trial court; and having done so, he cannot 
thereafter change to some different theory and thus attempt 
to keep in motion a merry-go-round of litigation". 
24 Utah 2d 301 at 303. 
WasatchMines Co. vs. Hopkinson, 24 Utah 2d 70, 465 P.2d 1007 (1970) 
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was a case where the defendant had failed to properly plead 
the statute of limitations, and thus could not have review of 
his contentions based on limitations. And the failure to make a 
proper record below was relied on by the court in American Oil 
Co. vs. General Contracting Corp., 17 Utah 2d 2d 330, 411 P.2d 
46 (1966) to refuse review of matters wholly foreign to the record 
on appeal because not mentioned in the pleadings nor in the find-
ings of the court below and not raised by motion to amend the 
memorandum decision of the court below nor by request for find-
ings. 
There is one exception to the principle set down in the 
above cases, arising from In Re Woodward, 14 Utah 2d 336, 384 
P.2d 110 (1963), in which the court decided, over a vigorous 
dissent/ that if the liberty of the appellant is jeopardized 
then constitutional issues not heard below may be raised on appeal. 
That case has no application to this appeal. 
Defendants demand that the judgment be reduced in amount or 
modified as to Van's Service, Inc. These contentions are wholly 
foreign to the record in their Rule 60(b) proceedings and should 
not serve as a basis for review on this appeal. 
POINT THREE 
The record justifies the trial court's denial of Defendants' 
Rule 60(b)(1) Motion. 
This court considered a denial of a Rule 60(b) (1) motion in 
Airkem Intermountain, Inc. vs. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 
429 (1973) and stated that 
-9-
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A: 
"The trial court is endowed with considerable latitude of 
discretion in granting or denying a motion to relieve a 
party from a final judgment under Rule 60(b)(1), U. R. C. P., 
and this court will reverse the trial court only where an 
abuse of this discretion is clearly established". (footnote 
omitted) 
30 Utah 2d 65 at 67, The court reasoned as follows in sustaining 
the denial: 
"For this court to overturn the discretion of the lower 
court in refusing to vacate a valid judgment, the require-
ments of public policy demand more than a mere statement * 
that a person did not have his day in court when full 
opportunity for a fair hearing was afforded to him or his 
legal representative. The movant must show that he has 
used due diligence and that he was prevented from appearing 
by circumstances over which he had no control". (Emphasis 
in the original. Footnote omitted) 30 Utah 2d 65 at 68. 
With respect ot he due diligence of the Defendants, the records 
show the following: 
(a) Defendant Glen Van Tassell, failed to appear twice at 
his duly scheduled and noticed deposition, and was only induced 
to appear under threat of sanctions from the court pursuant to 
Rule 37. (R-4, R-8, R-ll, R-13, R-18, and R-21). When he did 
appear, he failed to produce documents listed in Requests for 
Production incorporated in the Notices of Deposition, to which 
he never responded. (R-36, 37). 
(b) In June, 1974, Plaintiff served Interrogatories upon 
Glen Van Tassell. (R-38) These were not answered for various 
insufficient reasons and were the subject of orders, beginning 
September 30, 1974 (R-74). Defendant was ordered to answer 
again on December 19, 1974, (R-120). No written answers to any 
of these interrogatories were ever served. 
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(c) On October .17, 1974, Plaintiff served requests of 
admisssions on Defendant. (R-79 through R-89). The time for 
defendant to respond to these requests was extended by the Order 
of December 19, and again by the Order of March 10. (R-120, 
R-153). The time for responding ran prior to the trial date of 
March 19 , 1975. No response to any of the requests was ever made, 
and pursuant to the March 10, 1975, order the requests were 
deemed admitted at the time of trial. No motion has been filed 
for relief from the effect of these admissions, and therefore 
the Defendant Glen Van Tassell is bound by them. Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure 36. 
(d) Plaintiff heard a rumor late in February, 1975, that 
Boyd M. Fullmer was about to withdraw as counsel for Defendants. 
Therefore, on February 28, 1975, a notice was served on Mr. 
Fullmer and by mail to the last known address of Glen Van Tassell, 
urging the defendant to obtain new counsel in time for the trial 
scheduled herein for March 19, 1975. (R-149, R-150). Mr. Fullmer 
did request permission to withdraw a few days later, which request 
was denied by Judge Swan. (R-181)(Tr. of Apr. 24, hearing at 23, 
and 24)• On march 17, 1975, J. Reed Tuft served a Petition to 
Appear as Counsel for the defendants, by ordinary mail. The petition 
was expressly contingent on the granting of Fullmer1s petition to 
withdraw. (R-156). Tuft's position was tantamount to a refusal 
to go ahead on March 19 as ordered, because Judge Swan had stated 
that Fullmer had to stay on the case if his withdrawal would neces-
sitate a continuance. Tuft did not ask for a continuance, in order 
-11-
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to prepare for the trial, nor did he later attack the jdugment 
entered as a result of the March 19, hearing oh the merits, by 
motion for new trial or to amend the judgment or findings. 
(e) Plaintiff made repeated motions for sanctions against 
the Defendant for his failure to discover. (R-36, R-66, R-102, 
R-155) A detailed Memorandum was filed by Plaintiff supporting 
these Motions. (R-104 through 112). The court took the matter 
under advisement from time to time, but at the trial ultimately 
granted relief in part as a response to these motions, duly re-
newed at the trial, (R-160, 161). 
(f) The trial date was duly set by court order, served upon 
Defendant's counsel of record, and mailed notice was sent to 
defendant personally, (R-146, R-149, R-150). Notice was given 
before Fullmer had formally requested leave to withdraw, and no 
reasons are given why defendant should not be bound by this 
notice. Defendant claimed at the April 24, hearing on the Rule 
60(b)(1) motion that he had not realized the importance of the 
March 19, date, (Tr. of Apr. 24, hearing at 16), but Fullmer 
claimed that he had given notice of the trial setting to his 
client and had warned that he would again attempt to withdraw. 
(Tr. of Apr. 24, hearing at 21, 25 and 28). The trial court's 
finding with respect to this evidence is reflected in his Memo-
randum Decision of May 13, 1975, as follows: 
"This matter was set for trial for March 19, 1975, by Judge 
Swan. Defendant was advised March 19, was a "firm setting". 
Defendant was aware of this setting and of Judge Swan's 
order. 
-12-
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"...Further, the defendant was advised by his counsel, 
Mr. Fullmer, what would happen if he did not appear". 
(R-216) 
(g) Boyd M. Fullmer, who was allegedly discharged by Van 
Tassell and whose attempted withdrawal from this case occasioned 
Van Tassell's claim that relief should be granted under Rule 
60(b)(1), is now again counsel for defendants, raising an inference 
perhaps that the differences between him and Van Tassell which 
originally led to the attempted withdrawal were not as deep-seated 
as alleged in Defendants' motion under Rule 60(b) (1). (R-181 
at paragraphs four and five). Mr. Fullmer's lack of care is no 
ground for relief under Rule 60(b) (1). Hoffman vs. Celebrezze, 
405 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1969) (Government lawyer allowed judgment 
against United States for interest and later attacked it under 
Rule 60(b)(1) on the Ground he hadn't realized that the type of 
claim was non-interest bearing). 
In the fact of the record, as set out above, Defendant Glen 
Van Tassell has set out to show that he exercised due diligence 
and that judgment was entered because of factors beyond his 
control, as he must under Airkem Intermountain Inc. vs. Parker, 
supra; Warren vs. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 420, 260 P.2d 
741 (1953); and Peterson vs. Crosier, 29 Utah 235, 81 Pac. 860 
(1905). The court below made the following findings in its 
Memorandum Decision at R-216: 
"The facts of this case do not establish excusable neglect 
but rather an attitude of non-participation on the part of 
the defendant....The defendant had his day in Court and the 
judgment was rendered after a hearing despite defendant's 
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non-participation. Ends of justice are not served if a party 
may obtain delay and frustrate the proceedings of the Court 
by simply failing to prepare and failing to appear". 
Glen Van Tassell's conduct was like that of the appellant in 
Pacer Sport & Cycle Inc. vs. Myers, 534 P.2d 616 (Utah 1975), 
who had told plaintiff's counsel that he had sued the wrong de-
fendant and then taken no further action. Such conduct does not 
approach reasonable neglect, as the court held in Myers. 
The cases cited by Defendants in their brief are not to the 
contrary* Security Adjustment Bureau, Inc. vs. West, 20 Utah 
2d 292, 437 P.2d 214 (1968) was a case where punitive damages 
had been assessed without evidence and the defendant claimed he 
had received no notice of the motion for entry of default. In 
the present matter, the Defendants made no attack on the merits 
of the judgment in their Rule 60(b) (1) motion, and the trial 
judge found, as recited above, that defendants had notice of the 
proceeding. Chrysler vs. Chrysler, 5 Utah 2d 415, 303 P.2d 
995 (1956), cited by Defendants for the benefit of some favorable 
dicta, is an affirmance of a denial of a Rule 60(b) (1) motion 
from a judgment entered in a hearing at which the defendant 
chose not to participate, despite due notice to his counsel. 
The Chrysler case lends support to the ruling below, by the 
following passage: 
"It is claimed the plaintiff did not personally receive 
notice of the trial date until...the same morning.... 
Even if true, this circumstance would appear to be quite 
immaterial. His attorney had notice, and plaintiff's 
conduct there was entirely inconsistent with any bona 
fide intention to pursue this action in Utah". 
5 Utah 2d 415 at 417 
-14-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mayhew vs. Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P.2d 
951 (1962), does not support the Defendants' position, because it 
was a default judgment entered prior to any proceedings, on the 
basis of the failure of the defendant to file an answer, and set 
aside at the behest of the stockholders of the defendant company, 
who had no actual notice of the matter. No similar claims are 
made herein by either Defendant. 
Another case cited by Defendants, McKean vs. Mountain View 
Memorial Estates, 17 Utah 2d 323, 411 P.2d 129 (1966), was a 
default entered because counsel had been 27 minutes late to a 
trial of which he had received only two days notice. Counsel was 
anxious to proceed when he arrived but the court had entered a 
default and would not hear him with respect to the issue of 
liability. Below, however, counsel voluntarily left the proceed-
ings, having made no motion for continuance, stating that it would 
be a disservice to his client to try the matter without the file. 
The trial herein had been noticed up by regular notice and sub-* 
sequent court order and the trial date had been a matter of 
negotiation for some time before that. 
Russo vs. Aucoin, 7 So.2d 744 (La. App. 1942) was a lower 
appeal court decision in Louisiana. It is difficult to assess 
its relevance because it was decided under a different jurispur-
dence than our own common law and rules modeled after the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Nevertheless it is pertinent to show 
that Defendants have apparently not published the deposition cited 
by them in their brief, referring to the Russo case, and the 
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deposition testimony of.Plaintiff with respect to that matter 
is by no means as clear as Defendants argue in their brief. 
Furthermore, this matter was explored at the March 19, 1975, 
hearing. Findings of Fact 2, 3, 9, 15, 53, 54 (R-160 et seq.) 
and Plaintiff's Exhibit "D". (R-158). v 
Defendants have failed to explain why they discharged their 
counsel practically upon the eve of trial and failed to have an 
authorized representative at the trial, after due notice of the 
trial date. Defendant Van Tassell1s verified motion states: 
"That prior to moving his residence to Idaho, the defendant 
Glen Van Tassell was required to devote so much personal 
attention to the ranching operations in Idaho that he was 
required to be away from his home in Utah (where his business 
records were situated) for extensive periods of time, and 
was for long periods of time unable to be reached by phone". 
(R-180). 
The rule is stated by 46 Am.Jur. 2d Judgments, §718 as follows: 
"Parties are not justified in neglecting their cased merely 
because of the stress or importance of their own private 
business, and such neglect is ordinarily not excusable", 
(footnotes omitted). 
The Verified Motion of Van Tassell admits neglect of the 
inexcusable variety. The Court below properly refused to grant 
the relief he requested. 
POINT FOUR 
Defendants Did Not Move For a Continuance of the March 19, 
Trial Date and Should Therefore Not Be Heard To Complain About 
the Judgment Entered Thereon. 
A major underpinning of Defendants1 argument on appeal is 
the holding of Finch vs. Wallberg Dredgind Co., 281 P.2d 136 
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(Idaho 1955) where counsel refused to try the case and replacement 
counsel, with short notice, sought a continuance. In the case 
below, however, replacement counsel, apparently with notice of 
at least two weeks, (Tr. of Apr. 24, hearing at 19) made no 
effort to salvage the situation in a timely manner. The court 
in Brunson vs. Hamilton Ridge Lumber Corp., 122 S.C. 436, 115 
S.E. 624 (1923), reasoned as follows: 
"If a party to the action can force a continuance by the 
willful discharge of his attorney just before the time for 
trial, and then secure a continuance, there would be no 
way in which the trial of a case can be forced". 
No continuance can be reasonably expected where the court 
specifically rules that in case of a withdrawal there will be no 
continuance and orders the attorney to go forward, as occurred 
in the present case. Slaughter vs. Zimman, 105 Cal. App. 2d 
623, 234 P.2d 94 (1951). (Defendant failed without reasonable 
excuse to obtain counsel after permitting his attorney to with-
draw after notice that no continuance would be allowed). 
Where the Defendant hired a new attorney five days before 
trial and then sought a continuance at trial, the court in 
Flynn vs. Fink, 60 Cal. App. 670, 213 Pac. 716 (1923), reasoned: 
"parties litigant have no absolute right to insist upon a 
change of counsel at the last moment before the time set 
for the commencement of the trial, where such change of 
counsel requires a continuance in order that the case may 
be properly prepared for trial. Such a course, if permitted 
and if persisted in, might and probably would in many cases 
work the destruction of private rights of the opposing 
litigant and would be subversive of the 'prompt administration 
and execution of the laws, upon which depends largely their 
effectiveness'". 
If the Court proceeds with the trial on the date set in the 
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absence of defendants and no proper motion for continuance is 
before the court, there is no error in denying a continuance. 
Nahas vs. Nahas, 135 Cal. App. 2d 440, 287 P.2d 381 (1955). In 
Nahas counsel had made a motion for a continuance when the case ,.,.-• 
was called. The motion was not supported by affidavits required 
by statue. No evidence was presented for defendants. Judgment 
was rendered on the evidence, as in the case at bar, and sustained 
against the attack upon the denial of the continuance. 
In ruling against a continuance, it is deemed relevant that 
the defendant may have had a prior continuance. Dodd vs. Cowgill, 
85 Nev. 705, 463 P.2d 482 (1969). Defendant obtained a contin-
uance herein to postpone the trial from March 12, 1975, to 
March 19, 1975, on the ground that his then counsel, Mr. Fullmer, 
had a conflicting court appointment on March 12. (R-138, R-146) 
See generally Benson vs. Benson, 66 Nev. 94, 204 P.2d 316 
(19 49) (inability of new counsel to prepare no ground for contin-
uance where party and attorney could have prepared for trial by 
exercise of reasonable diligence). 
POINT FIVE 
The Default Entered on the Ground of Failure to Answer 
Interrogatories Should be Sustained. 
Plaintiff served certain interrogatories in June, 1974, to 
which Defendants never responded. At the time of trial Plaintiffls 
motion for Default judgment under Rule 37, which had been pending 
since March 4, 1975, was called up for a hearing before the trial 
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judge, A lengthy memorandum already on file supports said motion. 
Defendants have never shown any good cause for failing to answer 
the interrogatories. An inference ought to be drawn that the 
answers, if made, would support the entry of judgment. See 
Baltimore & 0. Ry. Co. vs. Carrier, 426 S.W.2d 938 (Kentucky). 
(Trial date set one day after answers were due; motion for ex-
tension of time denied 16 days previously; trial date had been 
requested eight months previously). Plaintiff requested a trail 
date July 12, 19 74, a little more than eight months before the 
trial date. 
POINT SIX 
No Relief Should Be Granted to the Corporate Defendant on 
This Appeal. 
No deficiencies in the judgment against the corporate 
Defendant were raised in \::oe Rule 60(b)(1) proceedings below, and 
therefore as argued previously the Court should not entertain such 
issues on this appeal. upon the withdrawal of Boyd M. Fullmer 
at the trial, default was entered against the corporation, and 
judgment was entered under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 55. 
Defendants make no objection to any of these procedures and did 
not appeal timely from them. Airkem International, Inc. vs. 
Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429 (1973) supports the entry 
of default under these circumstances. 
Furthermore, the record shows that Van Tassell used the 
corporation as part of his scheme to get money from Plaintiff, 
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(Tr. of Mar. 19, 1915, hearing at 5, 6, 7 & 8) Van Tassell had 
control of the books and records of the corporation, (Trial Tr. 8) 
he controlled the issuance of stock therein, (Trial Tr. 8) and 
that Van Tassell dealt with property in the name of the corpo-
ration. (Trial Tr. 20, 21) These factors show that the court 
did not abuse its power under Rule 55 to enter judgment against 
the corporation. '•:•>-.•. r 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully urges the Court to sustain the trial 
court, on the ground that Defendants have failed to prove due 
diligence or extenuating circumstances supporting their claim 
under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b) (1), thus failing to 
show an abuse of discretion below, and have failed to appeal in 
time from the judgment i file herein, tbns losing the opportunity 
to challenge the merits of that judgment on this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Bruce Findlay 
NIELSEN, CONDER, HENRIOD & GOTTFREDS 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff - Responded 
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SERVED two (2) copies of the foregoing Brief by Mail on this 
day of November, 1975, addressed to— 
BOYD M. FULLMER 
Attorney at Law 
540 East Fifth South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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